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HEALTH RECORDS PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY: PENDING QUESTIONS
Gerald S. Schatz*
"Privacy" and "confidentiality" of medical data and records in health
care and biomedical research on human subjects are the stuff of myth and
illusion, often more symbolic than substantive. Let me begin with some
definitions and my perspective, then mention some emerging technologies
and point to some important, lingering questions.
As I use these terms: The right to privacy refers to the right of the
person to be left alone in ordinary circumstances, to be free from arbitrary
intrusion into one's affairs by government and by other persons. As
against government, privacy may be a constitutional or statutory
protection. In the United States, to the extent that privacy protections
exist, they are enforceable in the courts in civil litigation and due process
claims. Confidentiality refers to safeguarding privacy. Records may be
subject to varying degrees of confidentiality in order to protect the privacy
of the persons who are the subjects of those records. Medical, health and
biomedical, as used here, include behavioral and social science and social
services. Technology is used here in the anthropological sense, to refer
broadly to how we work in a cultural and societal context. This is
especially important. Ultimately, people, not organizations or machines,
are the requestors, suppliers, processors, manipulators, users, buyers and
sellers of information. People are the devisors of systems for processing
information.
First, let me provide some perspective. After my wife emerged from the
cancer ward of a local hospital, that institution's contract fund-raiser called
and asked how her stay went on the cancer floor. A few weeks later, she
began getting targeted mail from the funeral industry. Today, the credit
card industry sends her offer after offer, praising her creditworthiness and
promising huge credit lines. Alas, she has been dead for nine months. The
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business world that would exploit health and medical records is neither
monolithic, nor invariably smart.
More perspective, the Hippocratic Oath obliges the physician to protect
the patient's privacy-including the privacy of the patient's house-but
only in part. The Oath bars the physician's disclosure only of what ought
not to be divulged from the physician-patient relationship. What ought to
be divulged is, in the Oath, a societal matter. The standard of care, so to
speak, does not include absolute confidentiality, although many physicians
believe, or dearly wish, to the contrary. The myths of absolute privacy of
the patient or biomedical research subject persist, as do myths concerning
the right and obligation of a caregiver or researcher to protect the
patient's or subject's privacy and to safeguard the health record. Of
course, there are readily acknowledged departures-chiefly for public
health and child safety and to interact with other persons and entities in
the patient's behalf. The cherished medical obligation of confidentiality
has both ethical and legal roots and is in continuing tension with societal
demands. In the United States, courts long ago cut deeply into the doctorpatient privilege. The United States Government and state governments
long have had access to health records in connection with health-care
subsidy, public benefit programs, schools, clinics, prisons, public and
private occupational safety and health, public hospitals and biomedical
research-including behavioral and social research. Law enforcement
agencies are establishing DNA databanks. The world's financial and
business structures and their regulation have changed. A large firm may
be involved simultaneously in banking insurance, and other businesses, all
in addition to its involvement in employee health benefits and
occupational health. At the same time, that firm may be subject to
multiple regulatory structures in each of several countries and in several
jurisdictions of federal states. Far smaller, independent firms may be
involved in some aspects of processing medical information.
Increasingly and dramatically, payment for health care in the United
States has shifted away from classic insurance and toward a combination
of government-subsidized facilities and care, government insurance, and
managed care in which insurance firms administer not so much their own
money as employers' benefit funds, employee premiums, and business
arrangements include drug company tie-ins. Information on the patient's
condition and treatment joins the financial record.
Accordingly, much may depend upon the uses and misuses of the health
record. Efficient use of information technologies in diagnosis, therapy,
prophylaxis, and research and development redounds to the benefit of
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patients, the public and insurance providers, as does efficient
administration of health benefit and public health programs.
But the easy availability of private information also lends itself to
invidious discrimination. For example social stigma or Kafkaesque denials
of mortgages or employment to qualified applicants whose health records
mark them as health insurance risks. Similarly, the easy and un-policed
acquisition and sharing of personal data lends itself to targeted marketing,
which some may deem a service and which others may deem an unconsented exploitation. Accordingly, the need to protect the privacy of
patients and research subjects and to protect the confidentiality of their
health records is a deeply felt, continuing concern of patients, research
subjects, ethicists, and healthcare professionals.
Legislation and regulation reflect the pendency of these concerns.
These concerns are not new. The National Research Council Computer
Science and Engineering Board sought in its report Databanks in a Free
Society to clarify the interrelationships of responsibility, confidentiality,
and technology: "It is the increased feasibility of data sharing, and not any
significant changes in either privacy or due-process interests, that will be
the most important effect of advances in computer technology" in these
regards. Clear implications then, in the Board's view, included extending
"the zones of personal and group freedom from compulsory data
collection," providing "greater rights of access by individuals to the
records maintained about them," providing greater rights to contest those
records, questioning the need for data collection case by case, and
abolishing some old files altogether." The criteria for data collection
would be demonstrable of a need to know and share. Why was the data
being sought? What uses would be made of it, and by whom? The report
by the Computer Science and Engineering Board was published in 1972.
These questions persist.
The emerging technologies of interest in this respect are, first of all,
organizational changes. Persons, subject to no health professional ethical
strictures have become negotiators, gatekeepers, processors, exploiters,
and vendors of patients' secrets. Research subjects and medical patients
are not negotiators in the international trade harmonization arena.
In ordinary, non-exotic health care, the use of the contract of adhesion
with respect to personal data is increasingly common. Some have
characterized it as "sign or die."
The emerging Internet technologies, including web-based medicine and
pharmacies; email; malicious coding; data-mining; and computer-based
private investigations all acquire and share personal data. Among the
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problematic emerging technologies, anticipated in that report twenty-nine
years ago, is a black market in personal data.
Pharmacogenomics, tailoring drugs to individuals, is an area of great
interest in medical research and development, but poses considerable
danger to health privacy absent adequate controls over acquisition,
verification, and sharing of personal information.
Genetic testing and disease prediction increase the severity of
consequences of breaches of confidentiality.
Tissue banking, cross-linkage studies, and longitudinal studies pose
difficult problems. Further, in some U.S. hospitals, patients are pressured
to provide tissue samples for use in the biotechnology industry. Over
several years, a great deal of tissue has been acquired in the course of
research, and by cross-linking with medical records it has become possible
to infer relationships between genetics and medical conditions expressed
later in life. Finding and tracking the individual subjects may raise issues
of unconsented invasions of privacy. Again, the consequences of
information leaks here can be severe for the individual patient and
confidentiality should not be a cover for violation of rights. However, that
shield may have to be penetrated in limited circumstances; for example to
ascertain that the taking of tissues did not come from coercive
circumstances.
Behavioral genetics, whether based on actual genetics or on family
background, behavioral genetics and related social research, may be
particularly troubling. Many proponents of research in this area see it as
the search for a key to' finding the predictors of behavior to facilitate
timely and effective. interventions. Studies of children deemed by
researchers to be "at risk" for behavioral problems fall into this category.
Often, these studies target slum school populations and involve school
personnel. Misuse and leaks of personal information from these studies
can be devastating in their effects. Students may be labeled and channeled
into ostensibly remedial or preventive programs without due process of
law.
Predictions of antisocial behavior may become self-fulfilling
prophecies. The predictions may come to haunt these children in law
enforcement proceedings and in searches for employment. The law
enforcement and security industry has been trying to sell the District of
Columbia Government a schoolchildren's identity card system. The card
would include health information. The processing system and facilities
would be managed by the D.C. Department of Motor Vehicles.
This is a troubling set of factual challenges, the more complicated both
in the United'States and Europe because of complex and seemingly
comprehensive regulatory structures. Notwithstanding the structure and
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content of regulation, the big questions remain: Why is the data sought?
How will it be used? By whom? What rights does the subject of the data
have?
The European Union's Directive 95/46/EC, on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, requires member states to legislate privacy
protections that begin with personal privacy as the default position, is
more protective than U.S. legislation and regulation on confidentiality of
personal records. The directive's efficacy remains open to question,
however. Thus, the draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union provides in Article 8 for "Protection. of Personal Data" that
instrument leaves open the question of remedy.
For all their gaps, these European developments have left U.S.
international companies scrambling to conform their personal data
practices to requirements in the European Union. This has been no
simple task, inasmuch as those same companies must conform to U.S.
requirements that do not make privacy and confidentiality the default
position. Rather, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the Financial Services
Modernization Act, seems comprehensive as to consumer privacy but
permits a great deal of data sharing unless consumers opt out. Recent
regulations promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 seem comprehensive at first glance, and were
announced by the Department of Health and Human Services on
December 20, 2000, as "Protecting the Priyacy of Patients' Health
Information." The HIPAA regulation is a records management
regulation. Neither HIPAA nor the regulation addresses comprehensively
the big questions such as; Why require the data? Who will use the data,
and for what purpose? The HIPAA regulation spells out certain
requirements for health records management, and it partly limits data
sharing. The Continuing Legal Education industry in the United States
has gone to work to train lawyers in HIPAA compliance counseling.
Perhaps more because of fear of government inquiry than because of the
rule itself, there are good-faith efforts to comply-although I doubt that the
rule will withstand judicial scrutiny or last long in its present form.
The thirty-one-page rule and its 338-page preamble constitute a
wonderful exercise for teaching administrative law. Consider: Does the
preamble correctly state its constitutional and statutory authority? Does
the preamble make sense? Notwithstanding whether it makes sense, is it
consistent with legal authority? Does the rule respond to an intelligible
principle in the legislation? That requires in turn that one look at the
legislation for an intelligible principle, and that is a difficult task. How is
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the rule designed to work in practice? It does not appear that any thought
has been given to how the rule would actually work in practice. What
protections does the rule provide and for whom? Who is exempted from
the rule's obligations? Law enforcement agencies and any public body
that wants to make an inquiry with an administrative subpoena or data
request is exempted from the rule's obligations. Who is exempted from
the rule's protections? Approximately eight million Americans who are
either prisoners or detainees. Detainees are people who have been
arrested but who have not been tried. Under what circumstances is the
rule superceded by more protective state law? The default is to the
federal requirement. How does the rule apply to various Federal and state
entities? These issues are effectively unaddressed. When is full
compliance expected? At least two years from the effective date of the
rule. What right of remedy is provided? None. What mechanism for
enforcement is provided? None. Yet these are basic tests for the efficacy
of any administrative rule in American law. Now with these questions in
mind, look again at the rule.
These are basic tests for efficacy. With these questions in mind, look at
the rule. It mandates certain health records management procedures, but
its exemptions are many and its enforcement provisions are empty. Some
of its interlaced paragraphs give, while others take back. Nevertheless, the
good-faith compliers will try to reorganize and reprogram their data
management to meet the requirements of the HIPAA and Gramm-LeachBliley rules, and the transnational firms will try to adapt to the various
European national implementations of the E.U. privacy directive. Well
before HIPAA, some U.S. health management organizations and
healthcare institutions instituted exemplary data-confidentiality measures.
That's expensive, it's not easy, and it is not the national pattern.
In several of the United States there are miscellaneous antidiscrimination statutes. Tort law still exists, and there are Federal statutes
that address discrimination. However, whether in the United States or
elsewhere, legislation and regulation notwithstanding, vindication of rights
is slow and expensive. There remain those nagging big questions. Are we
captive of emerging technologies? Consider these extracts from that
National Research Council report:
"Our task is to see that appropriate safeguards for the individual's
rights to privacy, confidentiality, and due process are embedded in every
major record system..."
"... What is collected, for what purposes, with whom information is
shared, and what opportunities individuals have to see and contest records
are all matters of policy choice, not technological determinism."
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We "cannot escape ...

691

social or moral responsibilities by murmuring

feebly that 'the Machine made me do it."'
That report has been around for more almost three decades. The issues
that it raised still await ethical, efficacious answers.

